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NUANCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
A RESPONSE TO PREDICTIVE POLICING AND REASONABLE
SUSPICION
Fabio Arcila, Jr.∗
ABSTRACT
In an engaging critique, Professor Arcila finds that Professor Ferguson is
correct in that predictive policing will likely be incorporated into Fourth
Amendment law and that it will alter reasonable suspicion determinations. But
Professor Arcila also argues that the potential incorporation of predictive
policing reflects a larger deficiency in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and that it should not be adopted because it fails to adequately consider and
respect a broader range of protected interests.
INTRODUCTION
Neither doctrinal nor theoretical nuance is a strength of our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Consequently, though I believe Professor Ferguson
correctly forecasts that predictive policing will be incorporated into Fourth
Amendment law and will alter reasonable suspicion determinations,1 that
outcome is sufficiently perilous that I will tilt against it. I have previously
contended that an important deficiency in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is its failure to adequately consider and respect a broader range
of protected interests.2 That same problem is likely to make the incorporation
of predictive policing problematic.
∗ © 2014 Fabio Arcila, Jr., Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship, Touro
Law Center. Thanks to Rebecca Drane Wood for her editing suggestions, and to my research assistants who
aided me on this project, Brian Hodgkinson and Christine Verbitsky.
1 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 263
(2012) (“[I]n its idealized form, predictive policing will impact reasonable suspicion analysis and become an
important factor in a court’s Fourth Amendment calculus.”); id. at 288 (“Predictive policing technologies
will . . . [be added] to the totality of circumstances from which courts can find reasonable suspicion for a
seizure. . . . [These] will end up being seen as a ‘plus factor’ . . . .”); id. at 304 (“Certainly an accurate
prediction of a particular crime, in a specific location, should have some effect on police officers and courts.”);
id. at 312 (“Predictive policing will impact the reasonable suspicion calculus by becoming a factor within the
totality of circumstances test.”); see id. at 305. But see id. at 304 (stating it is “too soon to evaluate” whether
“predictive forecast [is] appropriate to consider in the totality of circumstances”).
2 Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1324‒26 (2010).
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We may be better off in the aggregate if predictive policing is excluded
from the suspicion determination for numerous reasons having constitutional
implications, as I will explain below. This is not a Luddite position. I do not
argue for ignoring or discarding predictive policing. To the contrary, police
may still take advantage of a key benefit of predictive policing—highly
improved resource allocation—that results from technological advances and
improved criminological research. Predictive policing’s value will be in telling
someone like Officer McFadden from Terry v. Ohio3 where to invest time and
observational efforts. That benefit, in and of itself, makes predictive policing
invaluable to police and communities.4 Limiting predictive policing’s use this
way, so that it does not alter the suspicion determination in the way Professor
Ferguson anticipates, will ensure that predictive policing is not used as a
constitutionally illegitimate, shortcut replacement to the type of patient,
observant work that Officer McFadden did.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Understanding Suspicion
Professor Ferguson glosses over the distinction between probable cause and
reasonable suspicion, but this distinction can be important in assessing
predictive policing’s role in Fourth Amendment law. Terry makes reasonable
suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure of a person, which is why Professor
Ferguson understandably focuses upon it. But as a consequence, he makes only
passing references to probable cause, such as in his description that “[i]n order
to interfere with a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, law enforcement
officers must have either probable cause to search or reasonable suspicion to
seize an individual.”5 Though a defensible statement of the law, it is also an
odd formulation that suggests a nonexistent binary distinction between search
law and seizure law. Probable cause is not the only available justification for a
search; reasonable suspicion can justify a search as well.6 Reasonable

3

392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968).
See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 276 (“Crime may go down simply by establishing a police presence in
an area.”).
5 Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
6 The Terry Court declared reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a “stop and frisk,” which
automatically allows one search—an investigative questioning in conjunction with the initial “stop”/seizure—
and potentially a second search if the facts justify a “frisk” for weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1‒22, 30; see
also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983) (“We hold that the protective search of [an automobile’s]
passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry . . . .”).
4
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suspicion is not necessarily sufficient to seize an individual. Reasonable
suspicion sometimes suffices, in the limited circumstances that Terry
delineates.7 But Terry is a special rule. When Terry’s limited circumstances are
not present, Fourth Amendment law reverts back to the default rule that
probable cause, at a minimum, is generally required to seize an individual.8
Reasonable suspicion’s limited role is both substantive and important.
Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard applies only to completed felonies or
imminent crime9 (and its frisk authority applies only when a concern about
violence exists10). As Professor Ferguson ably explains, predictive policing
comes in many varieties, and not all of them will be sufficiently informative
about imminence to satisfy Terry. In these instances, reasonable suspicion will
not be available to justify a governmental seizure. To know whether the
imminence requirement is satisfied, specific information about the police
prediction will be required.
This need for specific information raises at least two difficult issues. The
first issue concerns the prediction’s temporal limits.11 To know whether
imminence is satisfied, litigants and courts must know the specific time period
to which the prediction applies. Presumably, three months should not satisfy
imminence, but will three weeks, three days, or three hours? The technological
advance that predictive policing represents will pressure reluctant courts to
make clearer pronouncements about what qualifies as imminence. These
determinations, however, are likely to be so fact specific as to obfuscate any
generally applicable guidance about imminence standards. Thus, they may fail
to meaningfully limit search discretion, though better limits are sorely
needed.12

7

See infra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Valerio, 718 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s
default rule [is] that all seizures must be supported by probable cause . . . .”).
9 See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009) (instructing that a Terry stop is lawful “when the
police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal
offense”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (holding that a Terry stop is justified when
police encounter “a person . . . [who] was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony”);
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that reasonable suspicion suffices under the Fourth Amendment “where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be
afoot” (emphasis added)).
10 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24, 28–30.
11 See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
12 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 323 & nn.333–34.
8
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The second issue concerns the specific manner in which the prediction was
generated. Outputs are only as good as the method for producing them. Thus,
as Professor Ferguson points out, assessing the legitimacy of a particular police
prediction will require peering behind the curtains of how it was produced.13
This will be true with regard to imminence when reasonable suspicion is
invoked to justify the seizure. Professor Ferguson notes complications that may
arise here, such as claims of a nondisclosure right due to proprietary interests,14
and I am pessimistic about achieving the transparency that should be required
before predictive policing is incorporated into Fourth Amendment law.15
Regardless of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is at issue,
incorporating predictive policing into the suspicion determination can raise
constitutional concerns because predictive policing can change the nature of
suspicion itself. Traditional suspicion has served as a useful protective concept
because it has encouraged searchers to think in the particularized terms that the
Fourth Amendment favors by targeting a specific individual based upon a
conglomeration of generally retroactive information, such as what was
previously said or done. These two factors—particularity and retroactivity—
are powerfully protective because they serve to forcefully limit search
discretion.
Predictive policing is instead general and prospective. It encourages
generalized targeting—not specific to any particular individual—based upon
prospective information—a prognostication about what may occur within a
particular time period. Indeed, this is its attraction; it is why predictive policing
works differently and is so enticing.
In this realization lies a cautionary tale because incorporating predictive
policing into the suspicion determination changes the nature of suspicion from
generally being particularized and retrospective to always being generalized
and prospective.16 Fourth Amendment history is marked by a hostility to
generalized searches. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in large measure to
ban general warrants,17 and the Fourth Amendment is best interpreted as
13

See id. at 319–20.
Id. at 319.
15 See infra note 45.
16 Note, however, the potential for predictive policing’s generalized nature to change, becoming more
particularized as technology improves. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2394683.
17 Arcila, supra note 2, at 1281–83 & nn.10–11.
14
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providing protections against generalized dragnet searches.18 Predictive
policing, however, can come perilously close to mini-dragnet searches of
designated, possibly small areas.
The potentially saving factor is the possibility of corroboration.19 Professor
Ferguson mentions several forms of corroboration, such as witnessing
someone peering into parked car windows or carrying a screwdriver where
there is a concern for car thefts, or carrying a large duffle bag where there is a
concern about burglaries.20 The validity of incorporating predictive policing
into suspicion determinations rests in large measure upon how stringent the
corroboration requirement will be.
From a conceptual standpoint, predictive policing’s hallmarks of generality
and prospectivity should often call for demanding corroboration requirements.
In a retroactive context, corroboration confirms preexisting knowledge and the
predictions that flow from it, usually in a manner that promotes particularity
because a specific person is initially targeted. This dynamic sequentially
improves reliability as more corroboration accumulates, which increases the
degree of confidence that the proper person is being targeted for a seizure or
search.21 In a prospective context, corroboration confirms predictions that flow
from preexisting data but in a generalized manner in which the initial focus is
not on any specific person. This dynamic can also sequentially improve
reliability as more corroboration accumulates, but the unparticularized starting
point corresponds with greater initial unreliability, which suggests that more
corroboration should be required as a counterbalance.22 Predictive policing’s
utility in targeting smaller geographic areas—and its potential to increasingly
target even smaller areas23—does not undermine this conclusion. This is
because geographic specificity does not, in and of itself, contribute to validly

18 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 109‒10, 143
(Summer 2010). For example, the Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse correctly held that it violates the
Fourth Amendment for police to engage in random, suspicionless traffic stops to run license plate checks. 440
U.S. 648, 663 (1979). The Court, however, suggested that less discretionary alternatives, such as the
“[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops” might be “one possible alternative.” Id. In
dissent, Justice Rhenquist rightly mocked this “misery loves company” theory of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
664 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
19 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 303 (explaining that predictive policing “must be corroborated by direct
police observation”); id. at 307 (“The key remains the observations that corroborate the tip.”).
20 Id. at 261, 309, 314.
21 Id. at 287 (noting the “individualized” requirement for suspicion).
22 See id. at 307 (“[T]he information in the computer is generalized, and that fact makes it less reliable.”).
23 See id. at 303, 311‒12.
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establishing probable cause or reasonable suspicion.24 Fourth Amendment
particularity is not a geographic concept.25 Thus, more demanding
corroboration requirements should generally be imposed because otherwise
predictive policing poses a real danger to Fourth Amendment protections,
especially with regard to the particularity requirement that is fundamental to
restraining search discretion. Consequently, we will be better off—and Fourth
Amendment protections will be better respected—if courts generally reject
Professor Ferguson’s contention that when predictive policing is at issue
“police may actually need less corroboration in their observations.”26
Imposing more demanding corroboration requirements in the context of
predictive policing will be difficult because current Fourth Amendment
corroboration requirements are already lax. This problem can be seen in
Illinois v. Gates27 and Alabama v. White,28 two Supreme Court cases that
Professor Ferguson discusses.29 In Gates, which concerns probable cause,30 as
well as in White, which concerns reasonable suspicion,31 the Court was
insufficiently demanding with regard to corroboration. In each case, the Court
deemed there to be adequate corroboration while ignoring crucial temporal
considerations.32 In Gates, inadequate corroboration existed without knowing
whether the Gates were driving directly back to their Chicago-area home from
Florida.33 But one cannot learn from the record when police sought the search
warrant for the Gates’ home, and thus it is impossible to determine the Gates’
location at that moment on their return route. In the absence of this
information, and as the dissenting Justices suggested,34 the Gates could have
been driving anywhere in northern Florida or to any other location in the
country, and either possibility would have materially undermined a probable
cause finding. Similarly, adequate corroboration was lacking in White until it
24 See id. at 292 (agreeing that suspicion requires “individualization, corroboration, [and] particularized
detail”); see also id. at 306, 310.
25 See id. at 305 (“[A] predictive policing ‘tip’ is not particularized to an individual.”).
26 Id. at 308. To be fair to Professor Ferguson, I acknowledge that he made this assertion while speaking
about predictive policing in a particular context—as applied to a specific geographic area—rather than
generally. But because I fear that others will not be as careful as he is, I think it useful to make my point
generally.
27 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
28 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
29 Ferguson, supra note 1, at 289‒91.
30 See 462 U.S. at 230.
31 496 U.S. at 326‒27.
32 See id. at 331; Gates, 462 U.S. at 243‒46.
33 462 U.S. at 292 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 See id.; see also id. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stevens’s dissent).
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was known whether White was driving to Dobey’s Motel, but police stopped
her car before it could arrive there.35 Though the majority took shelter in her
driving “the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel,”36 a decision truly respectful
of Fourth Amendment protections would have required police to wait to see if
she actually arrived there, particularly because such a delay would have been
apparently risk-free given the facts of the case.
Predictive policing might fundamentally undermine the Fourth
Amendment’s protections as historically and currently conceived. This risk is
especially acute if predictive policing is incorporated into suspicion
determinations without adequate sensitivity to many nuances,37 such as the
ones Professor Ferguson identifies,38 as well as others, such as the distinction
between our traditional suspicion models, which are retrospective and
particularized, and predictive policing’s generalized and prospective suspicion
paradigm. Accepting the legitimacy of predictive policing may require more
than accepting an evolving Fourth Amendment. It may require sufficient
agreement that we want a new Fourth Amendment.
B. Likelihood of Insufficient Safeguards
The difficulty in developing a new Fourth Amendment that incorporates
predictive policing is that, though we can conceivably fashion it to provide
levels of protection commensurate with our history and traditions, properly
dealing with the variety of predictive policing programs and the varying
contexts to which they are applied will require an attention and responsiveness
to nuance that Fourth Amendment law has not been able to achieve and is not
well placed to ensure. It will also require an expertise that lawyers are unlikely
to have or be able to master. While legislation provides an alternate route for
assuring Fourth Amendment protections, I am not optimistic about that
process. Thus, though predictive policing should be approached cautiously and
with care, I fear that goal is unlikely to be met.
Professor Ferguson does an admirable job of explaining predictive
policing’s nuances, and of acknowledging many of the safeguards that should
be implemented in response to it.39 As Professor Ferguson explains, predictive
35

496 U.S. at 327.
Id.
37 This is a point on which Professor Ferguson and I appear to agree. See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 265
(suggesting that predictive policing should not “unthinkingly” be applied in new contexts).
38 Id. at 314‒20.
39 Id. at 314‒16, 319.
36
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policing is a unifying term that masks extensive variety in the data and
methodologies used, types of crime considered and predicted, and reliability of
results. Consequently, I certainly agree with him that predictive policing
programs should not “unthinkingly” be applied to new contexts.40
Unfortunately, I predict that this is likely to occur, and also that it is unlikely
that the necessary safeguards will be adequately implemented.
Take, for example, the necessity of transparency with regard to predictive
policing.41 Professor Ferguson suggests that transparency might be addressed
“outside the courtroom,” such as through “[i]ndependent oversight boards,
audits, and other methods to test and retest the data collection and analysis.”42
While a helpful suggestion, this will not displace both an interest and need
during litigation for discovery about the applicable predictive policing system
and its results. However, abundant reasons exist to be pessimistic about the
adequacy of either nonjudicial or judicial mechanisms to provide sufficient
oversight and quality control over predictive policing. For example, given the
technological complexity of predictive policing, the potential size of the
enterprise, and a powerful free-market ethos, there is every reason to expect
private business to enter the fray, looking to profit from governmental entities’
desire to benefit from this new technology. Already, private enterprise is at the
forefront of other big data exercises. As private enterprise enters the field,
claims of proprietary information will increase, as Professor Ferguson
acknowledges.43 As this occurs, the adequacy of oversight—such as to analyze
code, algorithms, and underlying data—seems quite unlikely unless a powerful
mechanism exists for assuring it, such as guaranteeing access to the underlying
information by statute.
Legislation could also have an important role with regard to predictive
policing in other ways. For example, the degree to which predictive policing is
usefully incorporated into suspicion determinations depends upon the validity
of the data upon which it is based,44 and upon the likelihood that the resulting
prediction is correct. Legislation could be particularly useful in identifying the
required confidence levels and/or error rates that should be acceptable in

40
41
42
43
44

See supra note 37.
Ferguson, supra note 1, at 316‒20.
Id. at 320.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Ferguson, supra note 1, at 317‒18.
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predictive policing. This is particularly so because existing law is extremely
deficient in these respects.45
Professor Ferguson could advance his predictive policing project by, for
instance, proposing model legislation. Unfortunately, all such efforts might be
for naught, as the widespread agreement necessary to implement strong
legislation seems remote given the propensity to sacrifice privacy for potential
security.
CONCLUSION
For several years, struggles concerning technology have marked the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment docket, and Professor Ferguson’s
admirable work on predictive policing suggests that this struggle will continue.
Technological progress is tantalizing in part because of the increased
efficiency it promises. The debate over predictive policing again raises the
issue of whether the Fourth Amendment properly requires some law
enforcement inefficiency to safeguard constitutional values and, if so, how to
provide those protections.

45 For example, Fourth Amendment law provides virtually no safeguards over data entry due to the goodfaith doctrine and the exclusionary rule’s emasculation. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140‒43,
146‒47 (2009); id. at 153‒57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Fourth Amendment law appears similarly weak with
regard to confidence levels and/or error rates. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454‒55
(1990) (accepting a 1.6% success rate for a dragnet search, and approvingly commenting upon search success
rates of 0.12%, 0.5%, and approximately 1%).
Discovery in criminal litigation is also sufficiently weak that significant deficiencies in forensic quality
control, for example, are persistently discovered only after extended time periods. See United States v.
Wilkins, 943 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251‒52 (D. Mass. 2013); Mark Hansen, Crimes in the Lab, A.B.A. J., Sept.
2013, at 44; Joseph Goldstein, New York Sees Errors on DNA in Rape Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at
A1.

